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1. Introduction 
 
The structure of the financial sector and the implementation of monetary policy directly 
impact employment. To generate better employment opportunities in Ghana, central bank 
policy must encourage employment-generating investment, facilitate sustainable economic 
expansion, and maintain macroeconomic stability. However, the impact of monetary policy 
cannot be considered in isolation from the nature of the country’s financial institutions. 
These two policy areas are closely intertwined. The financial sector is the primary conduit 
through which monetary policy affects real economic outcomes, and monetary policy 
determines the amount and distribution of resources available to financial institutions. 
Therefore, monetary policy must be coordinated with financial sector reforms in order to 
reduce poverty and support human development. 
 
The Bank of Ghana has focused its policy efforts in recent years on controlling inflation. 
Keeping inflation at a moderate and stable level is an important goal of macroeconomic 
policy. However, in a country in which the quantity and quality of remunerative 
employment falls far short of its potential, the central bank can use existing tools and 
implement new policies that foster an environment to improve employment outcomes, 
while moderating inflation and keeping the exchange rate at an appropriate level. 
Similarly, the financial sector can be transformed to support improvements in the quality 
and quantity of employment opportunities. In short, what is needed is a broader framework 
for central bank policy and the financial sector, a framework that targets real outcomes 
such as creating more employment, while keeping inflation and exchange rate instability in 
check. 
 
This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of a UNDP-sponsored study on 
the linkages among the structure of the financial sector, central bank policy, and 
employment outcomes in Ghana. During the course of the study, the research team met 
with representatives from government, the banking sector, and non-government 
organizations in order to identify the core relationships and constraints that connect 
monetary policy, the structure of Ghana’s financial structure, and employment outcomes. It 
was apparent from our consultations that the focus of the study is both timely and relevant. 
There is a general consensus that the structure of the financial sector, the availability of 
credit, and prevailing interest rates directly impact employment outcomes – in both the 
formal and informal economies. 
 
The report is organized as follows. The next section provides background for the rest of the 
report – summarizing relevant macroeconomic trends and the current employment 
situation. Section 3 analyzes Ghana’s monetary policy regime and develops a critique of 
financial programming and inflation targeting. From this foundation, we describe the 
elements of an alternative monetary policy, one with an emphasis on real economic 
outcomes. Section 4 provides specific detail on the institutional and structural constraints 
currently operating in the financial system which prevent the sector from facilitating 
investment, growth, and improved employment opportunities. We explicitly link financial 
variables to real economic activity by investigating the determinants of productive 
investment. Section 6 presents financial sector reforms that would improve the financial 
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sector’s capacity to move Ghana onto an employment-intensive growth path. Finally, 
section 7 concludes with some specific recommendations. 
 
2. Background: growth and employment in Ghana 
 
2.1 Growth and macroeconomic indicators 
 
When employment expands along with production, the benefits of growth will be broadly 
distributed. Growth, therefore, is necessary, but not sufficient, for improving employment 
opportunities. Ghana’s growth record has been volatile in the decades following 
independence (Figure 1). During the economic crisis years of the 1970s, the growth rate of 
per capita GDP was negative on average. The introduction of economic reforms and 
structural adjustment in 1983 helped to stabilize the macroeconomic environment. Since 
that time, growth in per capita GDP has remained positive and remarkably steady. Data 
from the national accounts suggest that per capita GDP growth averaged 2.0 percent from 
1984 to 2003. 
 
Figure 1 
Per Capita GDP Growth, Ghana, 1961-2003 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
 
Investment in new productive capacity is essential if growth is to generate employment 
opportunities. Figure 2 shows total gross investment as a percent of GDP – both public and 
private – from 1961 to 2003. After the 1960s, investment declined in Ghana, reaching its 
lowest point in the years immediately preceding the economic reforms. Since 1983, the 
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level of investment rose and then, over the past decade, stabilized. In the 10 years from 
1994 to 2003, gross investment, as a percent of GDP, averaged 22.8 percent. This is higher 
than the rate of investment of many other low-income countries over the same period – for 
example, Kenya (15.6 percent), Malawi (12.9 percent), Senegal (18.7 percent), Cambodia 
(16.8 percent), and Pakistan (17.0 percent). It is also slightly higher than the average rate 
of investment for all low-income count ries over this same decade, 21.7 percent.2  
 
Figure 2 
Gross Investment as a Percent of GDP, Ghana, 1961-2003 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
The focus of this report is the interaction of monetary policy, the financial structure, 
economic growth, and employment in Ghana. Two macroeconomic variables play a central 
role in influencing these relationships: the interest rate and the exchange rate. Figure 3 
charts short-term interest rates – both real and nominal – since 1980. The government 
treasury bill (t-bill) rate is used as an indicator of trends in a short-term rate with little or 
no risk premium. Despite high nominal rates, real t-bill rates were negative throughout 
much of the 1980s, due to relatively high levels of inflation (averaging 47 percent from 
1980-89).  
 
It should be noted that, while the data on the real yield on short-term treasury bills allows 
us to track interest rates over time, the t-bill rate is much lower than the real lending rate in 
Ghana. Estimates placed the average real lending rate in Ghana in 2004 at around 16-18 
                                                 
2   World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM, 2005. 
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percent (Bawumia, Belnye and Ofori, 2005). We discuss the real costs of borrowing in 
more detail later in this report. 
 
Figure 3 
Nominal and Real Interest Rates, Ghana, 1980-2003 
(yield on short-term treasury bills) 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF and World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
Note: The inflation rate was calculated from Ghana’s GDP deflator.  
 
Nominal and real exchange rates from 1961 to 2002 are presented in Figure 4. Throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s, nominal rates (expressed as cedis/$US) were kept relatively stable. 
However, the high rates of domestic inflation in the 1970s led to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate which undermined the competitiveness of the export sector. The structural 
adjustment program introduced in 1983 induced a significant devaluation of the cedi. The 
real exchange rate has become more competitive since the economic reforms. 
 
As part of Ghana’s structural adjustment programs, the government pursued a series of 
reforms in terms of financial regulations and foreign exchange markets.  In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, there was a transition from a monetary policy regime that used direct 
controls to a regime that used indirect interventions in the money market (Sowa, 2002).  
Inflation has been increasingly brought under control since the switch, resulting in positive 
real short-term interest rates, but raising nominal rates even higher. Spreads between 
lending and deposit rates also widened significantly after the reforms. In addition, 
beginning in 1983, a series of reforms were introduced to liberalize foreign exchange 
markets and to make the exchange rate increasingly market determined (Sowa, 1999).  
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Figure 4 
Nominal and Real Exchange Rates, Ghana, 1961-2002 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF; World Development Indicators, World Bank; and U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
 
The composition of domestic credit changed in recent decades, corresponding with the 
period of structural adjustment programs and financial reform. As shown in Figure 5, 
credit to the public sector, including both government and public enterprises, accounts for 
the largest share of domestic credit. Beginning in the mid-1980s, domestic credit to the 
private sector as a percent of GDP began to increase, reversing a steady downward trend. 
In recent years, credit to both public and private sectors has increased simultaneously.    
 
At one level, the economic reforms that Ghana has implemented since the early 1980s 
appear to have been a success. Macroeconomic instability has been reduced, inflation has 
been brought under control, per capita growth rates have been stable and positive, and the 
real exchange rate has become more competitive. However, the success of the reforms in 
terms of some key macroeconomic variables has not been as apparent in terms of 
employment and poverty reduction. It is to these issues that we now turn. 
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Figure 5 
Domestic Credit to the Public and Private Sectors,  
Percent of GDG, Ghana, 1961-2002 
 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
196
1
196
3
196
5
196
7
196
9
19
71
197
3
197
5
19
77
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
19
91
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
private sector public sector
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
 
2.2 Employment and poverty in Ghana 
 
Improving the quality and quantity of employment opportunities directly links economic 
growth to poverty reduction.  Low-income households possess few assets of their own. 
Instead, the most abundant resource the poor have at their disposal is their labor. 
Therefore, a development strategy that more fully employs a country’s human resources 
and raises the returns to labor becomes an effective instrument for reducing poverty.  
 
Despite the reasonable record of per capita growth in recent years, the Ghanaian economy 
has failed to develop new and better employment opportunities and to more fully utilize 
the country’s labor force. Under the economic reform programs of the 1980s and early 
1990s, faster rates of growth did not improve access to decent employment for a large 
segment of the working population (Baah-Boateng, 2004; Fine and Boateng, 2000). 
Instead, the majority of employment opportunities continued to consist of low-income 
agricultural and informal activities. Moreover, formal public and private sector jobs 
declined. Persistent unemployment, underemployment, and growth in precarious forms of 
employment remained central features of the economy.  
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Table 1 presents a profile of the labor force, estimated from the data generated by the most 
recent round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 4, 1998/9). Of the labor force 
aged 15 to 64 years, 52 percent were self-employed in agriculture, 37.4 percent worked in 
the non-agricultural informal economy, and only 13.7 percent worked in formal public or 
private employment. Labor force participation rates are nearly identical for men and 
women. However, there is evidence of gender segmentation of the employed labor force. 
Formal employment accounts for a smaller share of women’s employment than men’s. 
Women are strongly represented among informal, non-agricultural own-account workers 
and unpaid workers on family enterprises. 
 
Table 1 
Percent of total employment in selected employment categories 
by sex, 1998/9. Employed population, 15 year or older, Ghana. 
 Women Men Total 
Formal employment, non-agricultural 
Formal private wage employees 0.2% 0.6% 0.8% 
Formal public wage employees 1.1 3.0 4.1 
Formal, self-employed 1.9 1.7 3.6 
Formal employment, agricultural 
Formal wage employees <0.1* 0.2 0.2 
Informal employment, non-agricultural 
Informal, self-employed 20.0 7.4 27.4 
… of which: own account worke rs 19.2 6.6 25.8 
Informal wage workers 2.2 5.9 8.1 
… of which: informal public wage workers 0.7 1.8 2.5 
Unpaid family workers 1.3 0.6 1.9 
Informal employment, agricultural 
Self-employed 16.3 22.2 38.5 
Informal wage workers 0.2 1.0 1.2 
Unpaid family workers 10.0 3.8 13.8 
Other (unclassified) 0.1 0.3 0.4 
TOTAL 53.3% 46.7% 100% 
Supplementary statistics 
Labor force participation rate 87% 90% 88% 
Unemployment rate 8% 7% 8% 
Source: Heintz (2005). 
* not significantly different from zero. 
 
The persistence of informal and precarious work has compromised the economy’s ability 
to translate growth into broad-based poverty reduction. Although poverty rates have 
declined on average, households living in poverty have actually become more prevalent in 
certain rural areas (GSS 2000). Much of the poverty reduction has occurred in urban areas. 
Moreover poverty rates remain high for a large portion of the employed population. Table 
2 shows the income poverty rates among working individuals by employment categories. 
Poverty rates are highest among informal agricultural workers. As noted above, women 
represent the majority of informal non-agricultural own-account workers and unpaid 
workers on family enterprise, employment categories with relatively high poverty rates. 
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Table 2 
Income poverty rates among employed persons (15+) in  
selected employment categories by sex, 1998/9, Ghana. 
 Women Men Total 
Formal employment, non-agricultural 
Formal private wage employees --- 26.5 25.8 
Formal public wage employees 36.5 43.9 42.0 
Formal, self-employed 52.0 45.8 49.2 
Formal employment, agricultural 
Formal wage employees --- --- 65.6 
Informal employment, non-agricultural 
Informal, self-employed 57.4 58.8 57.7 
… of which: own account workers 57.4 58.5 57.7 
Informal wage workers 40.3 43.8 42.8 
… of which: informal public wage workers 39.4 46.2 44.4 
Unpaid family workers 70.0 60.0 67.0 
Informal employment, agricultural 
Self-employed 74.4 72.9 73.5 
Informal wage workers --- 56.9 57.7 
Unpaid family workers 87.8 80.7 85.8 
--- = estimates not reported because there were less than 20 observations. Note: in  
Table 2, individuals  are considered poor if they live in a household whose reported  
income from all sources falls below the poverty line as described in GSS(2000).  
Source: Heintz (2005). 
 
In summary, Ghana’s economic performance during the period of economic reforms has 
achieved some success in stabilizing the macroeconomic environment, but has been less 
effective in diversifying economic activities, generating improved employment 
opportunities, and reducing poverty throughout the country. There are many reasons why 
economic growth has not yielded better outcomes. The focus of this report is on one set of 
contributing factors: the failure of monetary policy and financial institutions to mobilize 
resources in a way that supports the realization of development objectives. 
 
3. Monetary policy 
 
3.1 Monetary policy In Ghana 
 
Monetary policy has been strictly limited by macroeconomic stabilization agreements 
made with the IMF and World Bank in conjunction with IMF loans, the HIPC (Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country) initiative and the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) 
process. As described below, in addition to the typical IMF requirements to limit credit to 
the government and increase foreign reserves, the Bank of Ghana has also been encouraged 
to focus on reducing inflation into the low single digits. This focus on inflation fighting 
and the other limitations imposed by IMF conditionality has reduced the prospects for 
rapid economic growth and broad-based employment generation in Ghana. An alternative 
monetary policy which focuses more on real variables, including promoting employment 
and faster GDP growth, is both feasible and necessary if Ghana is to make more rapid 
progress in reducing poverty and generating sustainable development. 
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In this section we discuss the recent history of monetary policy in Ghana, the limitations 
that the IMF stabilization policies have placed on monetary policy, the further limitations 
imposed by the inflation-fighting focus, and, most importantly, suggest an alternative 
monetary policy structure that can enhance the role that monetary policy can play in 
promoting employment and reducing poverty. 
 
3.2 Financial programming 
 
Monetary policy has been strongly influenced by the IMF  “Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility” (PRGF) agreements and commitments undertaken by Ghana (see IMF, 2004b and 
2005) as well as commitments made in conjunction with the development of the Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), as part of the HIPC debt-relief initiative, and the 
Multi Donor Budgetary Support initiative (MDBS) (IMF, 2004a).  According to 
documents associated with these initiatives: “The focus of macro-stability in the medium 
term is to ensure prudent fiscal and monetary policy management to achieve price stability, 
maintain interest rate levels that are conducive to both savings and investments, and to 
ensure stable yet competitive exchange rates and a fiscally sustainable debt burden. The 
GoG (Government of Ghana) with its development partners have defined a number of 
macroeconomic targets and measures.” (IMF, 2004a, p. 38). 
 
Financial programming has been used since the 1970’s as part of the IMF’s lending 
programs to LDCs. This model has now been folded into the PRSP and HIPC processes 
without much alteration. The programming uses a set of “identities” and extremely simple 
models (at best, a set of assumptions about the structure of the economy) to establish a set 
of targets that the IMF will monitor and the government will have to meet in order to 
receive the next installments of IMF loans, or qualify for HIPC relief and other donor 
support. (See Easterly, 2002, for an excellent critique of this approach). 
 
As mentioned above, the typical program connects balance of payments constraints, the 
government fiscal deficit, and central bank policy in order to lower indebtedness to a 
sustainable level, primarily by keeping economic growth in line with likely available 
foreign resources from export receipts, aid and capital inflows. Increasingly, reducing 
inflation into the low single-digits has become a central focus. Therefore, two key central 
assumptions of these programs are (1) that inflation rates between 10 and 20 percent are 
bad for economic growth and reduc ing inflation below that level will not reduce economic 
growth; and (2) that reducing government spending is good for the economy, because more 
government spending crowds out private investment. We will return to the problems with 
this approach and assumptions below. First, we will explain how this approach is used in 
Ghana and other low-income developing countries. 
 
The primary targets and measures have been structured by IMF financial programming. 
Under the standard financial programming methods implemented by the IMF, target 
ceilings are set for central bank monetary and credit expansion and floors are established 
on net foreign reserves (see Barth, et al., 2000, and Blejer, et al., 2002 for good 
descriptions of these programs). The original motivation for these restrictions were to 
ensure the ability of program countries to reduce their foreign debt and remain solvent, 
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including protecting the ability of the IMF to get repaid. Recently, other goals, such as 
reducing inflation, increasing foreign exchange reserves and “creating room for private 
investment,” have been emphasized 
 
Table 3, adapted from Blejer, et al. (2002), illustrates how the programming works. As 
mentioned above, the main targets are net domestic assets ceilings (NDA) – sometimes 
called domestic credit ceilings – which directly limit the amount of credit that the Bank of 
Ghana can create, and net international reserve floors (NIR), which require monetary and 
fiscal policy to operate so to preserve a minimum level of international reserves. If either 
target is threatened – that is, if international reserves are too low or if net domestic assets 
are too high – then the policy calls for tightening monetary policy, usually raising interest 
rates or reducing monetary expansion. 
 
A key and troubling implication of this programming approach is that there is no clear set 
of conditions under which expansionary monetary policies are called for, even in a 
situation of slow growth and high unemployment. Even if both targets are met, 
programming does not call for expansionary monetary policy. This is largely because there 
is no explicit operational target for economic growth, employment creation, or poverty 
reduction. The bias of financial programming is therefore highly contractionary.  
 
 
Table 3 
Financial Programming with Net Domestic Asset and  
Net International Reserve Targets 
  Net Domestic Assets (NDA) 
  Higher than 
Programmed 
(Threatened) 
Lower Than 
Programmed 
(Not threatened) 
Higher than 
Programmed 
(Not Threatened) 
Only the NIR 
target has been 
met. Reflects 
overexpansion 
of money. 
Policy: 
tighten 
Both targets 
have been 
met.  
Policy: No 
need for 
tightening 
Net 
International 
Reserves 
(NIR) 
Lower than 
Programmed 
(Threatened) 
Neither target 
has been met. 
Policy: 
tighten. 
NIR has not 
been met.  
Policy:  keep 
tight to stem 
further 
reserve losses 
Source: Adapted from Blejer, et. al., (2002), Table 1. 
 
In addition, inflation targets have recently been stressed as additional goals of IMF 
programs. Inflation targeting (IT), or more generally, anti- inflation focused central 
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banking, reinforces this contractionary approach to central banking by adding an additional 
contractionary constraint.  
 
Traditional financial programming did not incorporate explicit inflation targets. Now, 
however, there are new commitments made by central banks to the IMF and associated 
organizations to reduce inflation. This essentially adds an additional restriction on central 
bank policy along with the traditional commitments with respect to domestic credit 
ceilings and reserve floors. (Blejer, et al., 2002). Table 4, adapted from Blejer, et al. (2002) 
illustrates this point. 
 
As Table 4 demonstrates, even if the NDA ceiling is met, if the inflation target is not met, 
then the central bank will still be expected to tighten credit. As we discuss, there are many 
problems associated with financial programming, and these are exacerbated when inflation 
targeting is added. 
 
Table 4 
Financial Programming with Net Domestic Asset and  
Inflation Targets 
  Inflation Target (IT) 
  Higher than 
Programmed 
(Threatened) 
Lower Than 
Programmed 
(Not threatened) 
Higher than 
Programmed 
(Threatened) 
NDA and IT 
give the same 
signal.  
Policy: 
tighten 
NDA and IT 
give different 
signals: NDA 
– tighten; IT – 
no tightening 
needed. 
Policy: 
tighten 
Actual Net 
Domestic 
Assets 
(NDA) 
Relative to 
Program 
Assumptions  Lower than 
Programmed 
(Not Threatened) 
NDA and IT 
give different 
signals: IT – 
tighten; NDA – 
no tightening 
needed. 
Policy: 
tighten 
NDA and IT 
give the same 
signal.  
Policy: no 
tightening 
needed. 
Source: Adapted from Blejer, et. al., (2002), Table 2. 
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3.3 A critique of financial programming 
 
There are many problems with financial programming that economists have highlighted:  
 
1. It is based on identities that, in practice, often have large and variable measurement 
errors (“errors and omissions”), thereby rendering precise targets problematic 
(Easterly, 2002); 
2. Their policy prescriptions are based on the assumption of constant or even one-for-
one economic relationships – for example a stable velocity of money or a constant 
relationship between domestic credit and the money supply – relationships which 
turn out to be highly unstable and often not one-for-one (Easterly, 2002); 
3. They often leave out other important channels of monetary policy besides changes 
in the money supply, channels such as credit and asset prices; and 
4. There are important variables that are assumed to be exogenous to monetary 
variables, which are, to the contrary, often affected by monetary policy, for 
example, the level of unemployment. (Easterly, 2002). 
 
This last problem turns out to be very important in considering output and employment 
effects of monetary policy in Ghana. 
 
In particular, financial programming is based on a new classical approach to 
macroeconomic policy that assumes tha t output growth is not affected by monetary policy. 
Hence, financial programming assumes that restrictive monetary policy will reduce 
inflation, without any long-run negative impacts on economic growth. Important evidence 
and reasonable theory suggests tha t excessive restrictions on monetary and credit and high 
interest rates do indeed have negative impacts on economic growth. We discuss some of 
this evidence later in this section. 
 
On top of these problems with financial programming, many other “structural” goals are 
often included as targets or even as performance requirements. Often included among these 
performance requirements is financial liberalization. While in the case of Ghana these 
goals and targets are embedded in the PRSP and HIPC processes, so that implicitly, 
poverty reduction is part of the overall framework, the key question for monetary policy is 
this: do these “stabilization” goals contribute to Ghana’s ability to reduce poverty and 
generate more employment, or do these “stabilization procedures” in fact interfere with 
these developmental objectives?  
 
3.4 Recent monetary policy in Ghana: application of financial programming 
 
Ghana’s recent experience with financial programming began after the 2000 election. 
(IMF, 2001). Due to devastating terms of trade shocks and macroeconomic policy 
decisions, inflation was running at over 40 percent per annum prior to the election, foreign 
exchange reserves fell to around one month’s imports, the cedi was depreciating rapidly, 
and reserve money was expanding at a rapid pace. The new government entered into a set 
of commitments with the IMF to dramatically reduce inflation, monetary growth, fiscal 
deficits, and foreign borrowing, as well as to undertake a number of policy changes to 
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stabilize the economy, promote private investment, and gain international acceptance for 
debt relief. 
 
Since that time, inflation has fallen dramatically, domestic and foreign debt have declined 
and economic growth has risen, partly as a result of macroeconomic policies, and partly 
due to fortunate circumstances, notably, dramatic improvements in cocoa prices and 
associated terms of trade. 
 
The key monetary policy issue facing Ghana moving forward is whether a continuation of 
the same focus on “macroeconomic stabilization” with strict monetary and inflation targets 
will serve the needs of Ghana’s population in terms of economic growth, employment 
generation, and poverty reduction. 
 
Table 5 presents information, gleaned from IMF documents on IMF targets for economic 
growth and inflation from 1999 to 2008, alongside information on actual growth and 
inflation during the period. 
 
As the table shows, inflation has come down dramatically since 2000, and is now in the 
low double digits (perhaps around 15 percent). Economic growth has increased from 3.7 
percent in 2000 to 5.2 percent in 2004, and is projected to grow to 5.8 percent in 2005. 
Nevertheless, rates of growth in this range have not been associated with the creation of 
better employment opportunities or poverty reduction throughout all regions of Ghana, as 
discussed in previous sections. Moreover, the primary goal of the monetary policy remains 
to reduce inflation and to keep economic growth in the 5 percent range. Performance 
requirements associated with the latest IMF review are consistent with those targets. As 
stated in the Memorandum “The goal of monetary policy will continue to be to reduce 
inflation” (IMF, 2005 p. 7).  
 
Table 5 
Inflation and Economic Growth, 1999-2008, Targets and Actual* 
 Inflation GDP Growth Per Capita GDP Growth 
 Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual 
1999  13.8  4.4  1.8 
2000 23.0 40.5 4.0 3.7 1.3 1.2 
2001  21.3 4.0 4.2  1.6 
2002 13.0 15.2 4.5 4.5 1.9 1.9 
2003 22.0 23.6 4.7 5.3 2.1 2.6 
2004 7.0 (7.7) 11.8 5.0 (5.2) 5.8 2.4 (2.6) 2.8 
2005 5.0 (14.5)  5.0 (5.8)  2.4   
2006 5.0   5.0   2.4  
2007 5.0   5.0   2.4  
2008 5.0   5.0  2.4  
* The most recent actual values were used in all cases. Figures in parentheses refer to altered targets in more 
recent documents. For later periods, projections are used as targets. 
Sources: IMF (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004b, 2005) 
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More specifically, over the next several years the IMF reports assume that real GDP in 
Ghana will grow at 5 percent to 5.8 percent per year, which, given estimates of population 
growth, would translate into per capita growth rates of  about 2.4 percent per year. The 
IMF assumes this rate is the natural rate of growth of the economy. However, the question 
is whether a relaxation in the inflation, monetary, and credit targets could generate higher 
levels of real GDP growth while maintaining adequate macroeconomic stability (IMF, 
2003; 2004a,b). 
 
3.5 Impact of monetary policy 
 
As we discussed above, the implicit assumption of much of the IMF financial 
programming is that tight monetary policy will lower inflation, but will not have 
significant long run negative effects on economic growth. Moreover, it assumes that larger 
increases in credit will significantly increase inflation without having salutary impacts on 
economic growth. 
 
But are these assumptions correct? It is difficult to know for sure because we have limited 
macroeconomic data on the Ghanaian economy. Still, we can learn enough about these 
issues from econometric work to assess, at least, the appropriate degree of confidence one 
should have in the IMF assumptions about the relationship between monetary and credit 
policy, inflation and growth. In the next section we report on econometric results from the 
Bank of Ghana’s econometric model. As we will see, the Bank’s model raises serious 
questions about some of the key assumptions implicit in typical IMF financial 
programming. 
 
3.5.1 Analysis by the Bank of Ghana (BOG) 
 
It is crucial to understand the channels and influence of monetary policy in order to assess 
the impacts of current policy and to intelligently propose alternatives. There have been a 
few instructive empirical studies on the transmission mechanisms and impacts of monetary 
policy, most of them carried out by the Bank of Ghana (eg. Bawumia and Abradu-Otoo, 
2003 and Abradu-Otoo, et. al., 2003). They have used standard time series econometric 
techniques to analyze the impacts of monetary policy, but have been hampered by data 
limitations and recent structural changes in the Ghanaian economy. 
 
The best studies have used Vector Auto-Regression Models (VAR), Vector Error-
Correction Models (VEC), and other time series techniques to examine the impact of 
monetary policy tools on inflation, exchange rates and economic growth. Unfortunately, 
the lack of meaningful time series data on employment means that we can only look at 
indirect measures of monetary policy on employment. 
 
Existing studies (see, especially Abradu-Otoo, et. al, 2003) find interesting results. They 
estimate a VEC on quarterly data from the fourth quarter of 1970 (1970-4) to the fourth 
quarter of 2002 (2002-4). The endogenous variables included in the analysis are: the rate of 
inflation (INF), real gross domestic product (RGDP), credit to the private sector (CREPS), 
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the 91-day Treasury bill rate (TBILL) and the real exchange rate measured by the bi- lateral 
exchange rate between Ghana and the United States (NER), and a broad definition of the 
money supply that includes foreign currency deposits (M2+). 
 
3.5.2 Interest rate shocks 
 
As discussed above, since the Bank of Ghana current ly uses a short term interest rate to 
conduct monetary policy, analysis of the impact of short term interest rates on the economy 
is of particular concern.  
 
Impact of interest rate increases on: 
 
Economic Growth: The econometric analysis shows that the implementation of a tight 
monetary policy (an increase in the interest rate) significantly reduces the growth of real 
GDP. Hence, in contrast to standard Washington Consensus views, a tight monetary policy 
does have a negative impact on economic growth and, presumably, employment. 
 
Inflation: Importantly, the reduction of economic growth does not initially reduce the rate 
of inflation. Instead, by raising the cost of borrowing, increases in interest rates initially 
raise the rate of inflation. This is a common finding in VAR analyses of monetary policy. 
Because interest is a cost of doing business, then increases in interest rates initially raise 
costs and are passed on as higher prices. In this VAR analysis, eventually, inflation falls to 
its initial level, but – and this is important – increases in interest rates do not, in the end,  
lower the inflation rate. Hence, there is a cost to raising interest rates (lower real GDP 
growth), without any apparent benefit in terms of lowering inflation. Indeed, the result is 
quite the opposite: inflation briefly increases as a result of the interest rate “shock”. 
Moreover, this decline in output is not simply a short term phenomenon. Real GDP growth 
stays below its baseline amount for three and a half years, according to the VEC analysis. 
(Abradu-Otoo, et. al, 2003, p. 17). 
 
The Real Exchange Rate: One surprising result concerns the direction and the size of the 
effects of interest rates on the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate initially 
depreciates when the interest rate goes up. To understand this result, it is important to 
remember that when the interest goes up, inflation initially increases. This could lead to an 
initial depreciation of the nominal exchange rate associated with a transitory real 
depreciation until prices adjust. Any over-shooting of the exchange rate would exacerbate 
this initial effect. 
 
3.5.3 Monetary shocks 
 
The money supply can also have an important impact on the economy. According to the 
VEC results, an increase in the money supply, from whatever sources, does have the 
expected results. Within the first quarter inflation rises and the real value of the currency 
depreciates. The central bank responds to the monetary shock, and the increases in 
inflation and exchange rates, by raising interest rates. The net impact of this is increased 
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instability in real GDP growth, but that growth falls below the baseline for a period of time 
due to the interest rate increase resulting from the Bank of Ghana’s monetary policy.  
 
 
3.5.4 Private credit shocks 
 
Some of the most interesting results concern the impact of private credit on the economy. 
Increases in private credit increase the rate of growth of GDP, while at the same time 
lowering the rate of inflation.  Interest rates also fall and exchange rates depreciates rather 
little. One channel through which private sector credit could increase economic growth is 
through its impact on investment. Later in the paper, we present evidence that shows that 
private capital flows positively impact real fixed capital formation in Ghana, but this effect 
only exists during the period of financial reform (1987 onwards). 
 
3.5.5 Effect of GDP growth on inflation 
 
Of significant interest is the impact of increases in real GDP growth on inflation. The VEC 
results indicate that increases in real GDP growth have relatively small, and short- lived, 
positive effects on inflation. This suggests that the inflationary costs of increasing output 
growth are likely to be small. This is to be expected since increases in GDP growth have 
not only a demand side effect, which might raise inflation, but it also increases supply, 
which would tend to lower prices and inflation.  
 
3.5.6 Conclusion from the VEC analysis 
 
The Bank of Ghana’s VEC model of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is 
instructive. It suggests that increases in interest rates can have a stagflationary impact on 
the economy, causing both an increase in inflation and a reduction in real GDP growth. 
The implication of these results is that a monetary policy oriented toward lowering the 
inflation rate by raising interest rates could be very difficult to carry out successfully and 
may have significant costs in terms of output growth, employment and poverty reduction. 
At the same time, policies to increase GDP growth have relatively small positive impacts 
on inflation, possibly because of supply-side impacts. It is important to add to this picture 
the relationship between the exchange rate and inflation. The VEC results suggest a 
positive pass-through of exchange rate depreciations on inflation, but the impact is not 
one-for-one. More work is necessary to more precisely pin down the effect. 
 
3.5.7 Our econometric estimates of monetary policy 
 
The Bank of Ghana’s VEC model described above gives a good picture of the channels 
and impacts of monetary variables. But it does not give us clear estimates of the impacts of 
changes in monetary policy rules on economic growth, and on other variables of interest, 
including inflation and exchange rates. 
 
In order to estimate the impacts of changes in monetary policy, we built two simple macro-
econometric models of monetary policy. We used a similar but somewhat simpler 
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approach because of data limitations and othe r considerations (see Appendix A for much 
more detail on our model and simulations). Our models contain the following endogenous 
variables: exchange rate changes, inflation, and economic growth. Both models use the 
price of oil as an exogenous variable. The two models differ in that one adds the short term 
interest rate as the tool of monetary policy and the other uses the rate of growth of the 
money supply as the tool of monetary policy. 
 
Interest Rates as Tool of Monetary Policy 
 
The first VAR model examines four endogenous variables: treasury bill rate (t-bill), the 
rate of change of the exchange rate (exchange rate), the rate of real economic growth 
(growth) and inflation (inflation). The logarithm of the price of oil is included as an 
exogenous variable. 
 
The time period of the analysis is 1986 Q1 about 2004 Q4.  Figure 6 shows the impacts of 
lowering the interest rate by 2% points. The impacts on inflation, exchange rates and 
economic growth are all relatively modest. These results suggest that more expansionary 
  
Figure 6 
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monetary policy would not, according to these estimates, have large costs in terms of 
higher inflation and more variable exchange rates; but on the other hand, interest rate 
policy would have to be complemented by other policies to have significant impacts on 
economic growth. As we will see below, monetary policy that focuses on increasing the 
money supply could have larger impacts on the economy 
 
VAR with Money Supply as tool of Monetary Policy 
 
The second VAR model substitutes money supply growth (using M2 as the definition of 
money), and includes exchange rate changes, inflation and real GDP growth as the other 
endogenous variables, and the logarithm of the price of oil as an exogenous variable. The 
impulse response functions (not shown) indicate that the money supply has fairly standard 
effects on output, exchange rates and inflation. We used this estimated VAR model to 
perform monetary policy experiments to show the impacts of more expansionary monetary 
policy.  We used this model to simulate the impact of an increase in the rate of growth of 
the money supply by 5% points per year and keeping the higher growth rate for 5 years, 
over the period, 2000Q1 to 2004Q4 (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 
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The impact on economic growth is to raise economic growth rate by an average of a 
quarter of a percentage point; inflation goes up by at most 2 percentage points. And the 
rate of exchange rate depreciation goes up by 2 or 3 percentage points.  
 
Our results indicate that more expansionary monetary policy has modestly positive impacts 
on economic growth, without having large negative impacts on inflation and exchange 
rates. For example, as Table 6 below indicates, an increase of money supply growth by 5% 
points for five years over the baseline will, on average, annually lead to a quarter 
percentage point increase in economic growth while raising inflation by only 1.5 % points. 
Exchange rate depreciation increases only modestly 
 
Table 6. 
Monetary Simulation:  
Impact of Money Growth Increase by 5% Points, held over year period 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EXCHANGE RATE 1.51 0.70 1.83 1.82 2.17 
GROWTH 0.05 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.28 
INFLATION 0.27 2.07 2.30 1.77 1.50 
PRICE OF OIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MGROWTH 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Notes: Exchange Rate Change is percentage rate of change of the exchange rate – an increase is a 
depreciation; “growth” is % rate of growth of real GDP; Inflation is “rate of” inflation; price of oil is the 
logarithm of the price of oil. 
Source: See Appendix A. 
 
3.5.8 Summary of econometric model results 
 
Our results and those of the Bank of Ghana together imply that a responsibly more 
expansionary monetary policy is both feasible and can have positive impacts on economic 
growth without having significantly negative impacts on inflation and economic growth. 
Moreover, the results indicate that interest rate increases can have stagflationary costs, and 
that increases in GDP growth appear to have minimal impacts on inflation. Hence, having 
a narrow focus on controlling inflation by raising interest rates and moderating economic 
growth in order to contain inflation is not a sensible strategy, especially in light of the 
significant costs in terms of forgone income and employment in a poor country such as 
Ghana. 
 
But, our results also show that more expansionary monetary policy, by itself, cannot solve 
the problem of low growth, employment and poverty. Other complementary policies, 
including new financial market policies, will be necessary as well. Given the difficulties in 
identifying macroeconomic relationships in Ghana, especially given data limitations and 
structural uncertainties, one cannot draw definitive conclusions about economic policy 
from this econometric exercise. But the results do suggest some very important lessons in 
relation to the IMF financial programming model.  
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3.5.9 A note on the costs of inflation 
 
Given that the costs of fighting inflation are significant, as just described, the question 
arises: how large are the benefits? The answer is that the benefits of lowering inflation 
depend on, among other factors, how high the inflation rate is to begin with. Most research 
suggests that inflation above 20 percent per annum can have significant negative 
consequences for employment, poverty and economic growth. On the other hand, there is 
very little evidence that inflation at 20 percent or below has significant negative impacts 
(see, for example, Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Pollin and Zhu, 2005). Applied to the case of 
Ghana, these results suggest that bringing down the inflation rate from 40 percent to below 
20 percent after 2000 was in all likelihood an important and useful product of Ghanaian 
macroeconomic policy. However, the same results do raise the question of whether it 
makes sense to establish a goal of bringing down the inflation rate significantly further to 
the low single digits as is enshrined in most of the IMF and PRSP documents. The costs in 
terms of excessive real interest rates and forgone output, income and employment can be 
much greater than the benefits. 
 
3.6 Monetary Policy for Employment Creation and Poverty Reduction 
 
Now that Ghana has stabilized the inflation rate at a moderate level, and foreign debt 
obligations will be significantly reduced, monetary policy should focus more on generating 
employment and more rapid economic growth, rather than reducing inflation rates even 
further at quite uncertain benefits. As discussed above, the emphasis on reducing inflation 
adds an additional constraint to the already highly constraining monetary, debt and 
reserves targets. Moreover, these targets and the tools used to achieve them – ceilings on 
domestic credit (or reserve money) and floors on international reserves – themselves have 
rather uncertain impacts on the Ghanaian economy. Yet, as our discussion above makes 
clear, their bias is in the contractionary direction. 
 
It is time to place employment center stage along with inflation control, debt reduction and 
reserve accumulation in the formulation of monetary policy. Doing so would entail the 
following: 
 
1. As long as other targets are met, the Bank of Ghana should push as much as 
possible in the expansionary direction, rather than maintaining excessive caution 
with respect to the monetary policy setting. 
 
2. The focus on reducing inflation to the low single digits should be abandoned. 
Instead, the Bank of Ghana should stabilize inflation at its current rate, and protect 
against significant increases in the inflation rate. 
 
3. The Bank of Ghana has already created two tools to help evaluate monetary policy 
choices in terms of their impact on real economic performance – a Composite 
Index of Economic Activity and a Business Confidence Index. The Composite 
Index of Economic Activity includes a variety of indicators that are available on a 
timely basis. These indicators provide a sense of where the real economy is heading 
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and can be used to adjust decisions concerning monetary policy. The Composite 
Index of Economic Activity also incorporates a measurement of employment, 
available from SSNIT, which could be further developed into an instrument for 
employment-targeting. The Business Confidence Survey provides useful 
information on prevailing sentiments concerning economic performance – another 
tool for enriching monetary policy deliberations. These current initiatives could be 
strengthened over time to provide a foundation for incorporating real targets into 
monetary policy decision-making. 
 
4. The Bank of Ghana should loosen its credit ceilings to support credit expansion for 
employment generating and poverty reducing financial intermediation. This would 
allow a more rapid increase in money and credit, which, as we saw above, can lead 
to somewhat more rapid real economic growth. This policy will need to be 
supported by other changes in the financial sector if it is to have a major impact on 
employment and poverty. As we discuss below, banks are relatively unwilling to 
invest the effort to find worthy borrowers, as the high levels of excess reserves 
attest. A more active approach through the credit policies of the Bank of Ghana, 
especially to support lending by small and rural banks, would likely be much more 
effective. 
 
 
4. Role of the Financial Sector 
 
4.1 Financial constraints to improving employment opportunities 
 
Clearly, the conduct of monetary policy has a direct effect on Ghana’s ability to realize an 
employment- intensive development path.  However, the structure of the financial sector 
impacts the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing economic outcomes. Ghana’s 
financial institutions, dominated by the banking sector, are not currently structured to 
mobilize resources for investment and employment creation. Instead, banks are geared to 
extend a limited amount of high cost, short-term credit.  
 
One of the central roles of a financial system is to facilitate the management of risk 
associated with the process of development. However, the possibilities for risk 
management in Ghana are circumscribed by limited access to the appropriate type of 
developmental financial services that would encourage investment. Barriers to credit and 
financial markets are a particularly severe problem for smaller enterprises and those 
operating in the informal economy. Rural entrepreneurs and individuals engaged in 
agricultural production also have limited access to affordable credit. Since these activities 
account for the vast majority of employment in the country, financial constraints have a 
negative impact on efforts to improve employment opportunities.  
 
Not only is access to credit limited, the cost of credit is also high in Ghana. This represents 
a significant constraint for many investors, large and small, both in terms of direct costs 
and cash flow management. Under these conditions, firms are reluctant to take advantage 
of investment opportunities by borrowing. Those enterprises with existing debt can 
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encounter problems making required payments, adding to the uncertainty of sustaining 
productive activities and employment. Many factors are frequently identified as 
contributing to the high cost of credit in Ghana: large interest rate spreads, concentration in 
the banking sector, the asset portfolio of banks (including reserves), and high transactions 
costs, in some cases linked to inadequate information. 
 
Before moving into a more detailed discussion of the specific structural barriers found in 
Ghana’s financial sector, it is important to consider these institutional constraints within a 
larger context. Specifically, financial constraints may not be the only, or even the most 
binding, constraints to economic development and poverty reduction in Ghana. Removing 
the financial barriers that impede the improvement of employment opportunities in Ghana 
must be coordinated with other policy interventions.  
 
For example, small, agricultural enterprises might be able to make productivity- improving 
investments with adequate and affordable sources of credit, but there might not be any 
incentive to undertake these improvements unless the producers have access to markets. 
Securing access to markets could involve new infrastructure investments, expanding 
domestic demand, providing business services that facilitate exchanges between sellers and 
potential buyers, or creating marketing channels for non-traditional exports. Providing 
access to credit is necessary, but not sufficient, for improving employment outcomes in 
Ghana.  
 
Financial reform and monetary policies must be seen as elements of a broader, coherent 
policy framework for development. Otherwise, simply removing barriers by changing the 
nature of the financial sector will not yield the desired outcomes. This section of the report 
describes the financial sector constraints and policy issues that should be address within a 
broad development strategy. The next section, Section 5, proposes some possible solutions.  
 
4.2 Limited access to affordable credit 
 
As described above, the financial intermediation system in Ghana is not operating so as to 
promote economic growth and employment. Among the most important problems in this 
regard is the lack of access to medium- and long-term credit at low lending rates.  Three 
core factors that contribute to the relatively high cost of credit are: (1) the unusually high 
interest rate spreads between lending and deposit rates, (2) the high level of concentration 
in the banking sector, and (3) the asset portfolio of the individual banks. 
 
4.2.1 Interest rate spread (deposit/lending rates) 
 
The spread between lending and deposits rates is extremely large in Ghana, and has 
increased after financial markets were liberalized in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Sowa 
2002). Table 7 presents the interest rate spread in the Ghanaian Banking system relative to 
the spreads in several other sub-Saharan Africa. Ghanaian interest rate spreads are among 
the highest in Africa. 
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Table 7 
Lending Rates and Spreads. 
 Lending Rate Spread* 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Ghana 47.0 28.8 30.2 21.3 
Gabon 22.0 18.0 17.0 13.0 
Kenya 22.3 12.5 14.2 10.1 
Mauritius 20.8 21.0 11.2 12.8 
Mozambique 19.0 19.2 9.3 9.3 
Nigeria ** 21.3 19.2 9.6 5.5 
Tanzania ** 21.6 13.9 14.2 9.7 
Uganda 22.9 20.6 13.1 12.9 
Zambia 38.8 30.7 18.6 19.2 
* Spread: Lending rate minus deposit rate (not shown). 
** For Nigeria and Tanzania, the central bank lending rate is shown.  
Source: Bawumia, Belnye and Ofori (2005), p. 3. 
   
As Table 7 shows, even though the bank spread in Ghana has dropped by almost one-third 
between 2000 and 2004, it is still extremely high. Moreover, the bank lending rate still 
stood at almost 30 percent on average in 2004. During most of 2004, the inflation rate 
hovered around 12 percent. Therefore, a rough estimate of the real lending rate in 2004 
was 18 percent, a very high real rate of interest by any standard. Lending rates for small 
producers and informal enterprises could be substantially higher. Although there is no 
complete consensus on the reasons for such high real interest rates and spreads, there are a 
number of factors which most ana lysts agree play a role. 
 
4.2.2 Concentration in the banking sector 
 
The banking sector currently consists of a significant number of different types of 
institutions, with approximately twenty major banks and 120 rural and community banks. 
The major banks group consists of 8 commercial banks, 3 development banks, 2 merchant 
banks, 6 universal banks and one apex bank (Bawumia, et. al., 2005, p. 4). The degree of 
concentration in the banking system has fallen somewhat in the last few years, but it 
remains high. The top five banks hold about 70 percent of the banking assets and deposits. 
Moreover, there is significant evidence of interest rate coordination among the banks 
(Buchs and Mathisen, 2005; Bawumia, et. al, 2005). 
 
4.2.3 Asset portfolio of banks and excess reserves 
 
At the same time that interest rates and spreads are very high, banks held large amounts of 
excess reserves. Table 8 shows the relationship between required and actual reserve ratios 
of deposit money banks (DMB’s). Reserve ratios are the leve l of reserves expressed as a 
percentage of total deposits. It should be noted that, as of July 1st, 2005, the secondary 
reserve requirement was reduced to 15 percent, down from 35 percent. This should cause 
the composition of reserves to shift from that portrayed in Table 8. Nevertheless, the fact 
that banks argue that reserve requirements are too high is puzzling, in light of the high 
level of excess reserves. 
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Table 8. 
Required and Excess Reserves Among Deposit Taking Banks 2003 and 2004 
 Primary Secondary Total 
 Minimum Actual Minimum Actual Minimum Actual 
December 
2003 
9.0 9.8 35.0 69.4 44.0 82.9 
December 
2004 9.0 9.7 35.0 45.0 44.0 57.3 
Source: Bank of Ghana, Statistical Bulletin, January, 2005a, Table, 7. 
 
The treatment of foreign exchange deposits provides a partial explanation for why banks 
argue for a lower reserve requirement. Although primary reserves are held as foreign 
exchange, the entire secondary reserve ratio of 15 percent (35 percent prior to July 2005) 
must be held in cedis. This imposes modest costs on banks with significant foreign 
exchange deposits. However, the rules governing foreign exchange deposits cannot fully 
explain the pattern of reserves observed in the banking sector. 
 
Apart from high excess reserves, banks also hold a large amount of government securities. 
Banks hold about 20 percent of their assets in government securities, and another eight 
percent in the paper of public corporations. They hold about 10 percent more in cash. This 
leaves only about 30 percent to be held in claims on the private sector (Bank of Ghana, 
2005a). In recent years, falling interest rates on these assets have reduced the level of 
investment in public securities. Nevertheless, the overall level of investment in public debt 
instruments remains quite high. 
 
Most analysts suggest that the availability of high interest rate government securities help 
to keep lending rates high. Of course, this cannot explain why deposit rates are so low, and 
therefore why spreads are so high. The holding of large excess reserves might help to 
explain these large spreads, but it is still unclear as to why the banks hold such large excess 
reserves. 
 
One explanation might be the absence of deposit insurance. A second contributing factor 
might be insufficient numbers of low cost, low risk borrowers. A third factor might be a 
lack of motivation on the part of bankers to find and develop more customers who can 
become effective borrowers. This lack of motivation might stem from a lack of 
competition and an absence of compelling reason due to the high profitability of investing 
in other assets.  
 
In principle, the government could play an important role in generating more motivation 
for banks to more effectively utilize their reserves to develop and fund new customers. 
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4.3 Dominance of short-term credit 
 
Most credit in Ghana is short-term. 3 There is inadequate credit for medium- and long-term 
investments. A number of factors constrain the availability of longer-term credit, one of the 
most important being the term structure of deposits. As a result of the short-term structure 
of deposits, banks are limited in their ability to make long-term loans. The lack of long-
term deposit instruments, of deposit insurance, or the existence of secondary markets for 
loans, severely limits the maturity transformation capabilities of the banking system. As a 
result, the deposit money banks are unable to provide needed long-tem credit. The limited 
diversity of credit instruments reduces the ability of the financial sector to facilitate the 
management of risk for producers and investors.  
 
4.4 Limited access to credit, particularly in rural areas and among smaller firms 
 
One of the obstacles to generating more employment is the limited access smaller firms 
have to credit. According to several recent studies, most small and medium sized firms felt 
constrained in their access to credit. “A good majority of the firms, 62 percent, felt fully 
constrained in accessing funds while 19 percent felt partially constrained. Only 12 percent 
felt unconstrained in accessing funds. This means a good majority of firms 81 percent felt 
somewhat constrained in having access to funding.” (Ofei, 2001; see also Gokel and 
Akoena, 2002). 
 
Credit is also hard to come by in rural areas, where self-employment in small-scale 
agriculture dominates the economic opportunities available. As pointed out earlier, poverty 
rates are highest among individuals working informally and in the agricultural sector. 
Therefore, if the financial sector is to support poverty reduction, it must facilitate 
investment to raise living standards and improve employment among informal workers and 
rural producers. 
 
There are various reasons why most small-scale and rural producers do not have adequate 
access to credit. First, transactions costs tend to be high for smaller borrowers. A large 
number of small-scale loans are more costly to deal with than a few large ones. Second, 
low-income borrowers might not have the collateral to secure a loan. Under these 
circumstances, banks will be reluctant to lend. Third, information about potential 
borrowers is lacking. This is particularly true for small-scale producers and informal 
enterprises. Fourth, the lack of skills and business background to manage credit and cash 
flows limits access to finance. Therefore, small producers require more of the banks’ time 
and resources in terms of monitoring.  
 
In the rural sector, a system of agricultural banks has been established to help extend 
financial services and credit to this sector. The network of rural banks and associated 
offices is fairly extensive, providing an alternative tier of banking for the rural economy. 
However, the distribution of these banks is not even throughout the country. Table 9 
presents the ratio of licensed rural banks and registered offices to the population for 9 of 
                                                 
3    Although bank credit is almost entirely short-term, the repeated rolling-over of short-term loans in Ghana 
has allowed some firms to use such loans for long-term finance (Brownbridge, 1998). 
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Ghana’s administrative regions. The three least well-served regions – the Upper East, 
Upper West, and North Regions – are also the areas with the highest poverty rates, with 
much of the population relying on small-scale, informal agricultural production. 
 
Table 9 
Regional Differences in Number of Licensed Rural Banks and Offices 
Region 
Licensed Rural 
Banks and 
Registered Offices 
Population, 
2000 
(‘000s) 
Population per 
Rural Bank 
(‘000s) 
Poverty Rates 
(GLSS 
1998/9) 
Ashanti 22 3,188 145 28% 
Central 21 1,580 75 48% 
Eastern 19 2,109 111 44% 
Brong-Ahafo 18 1,825 101 36% 
Western 12 1,843 154 27% 
Volta 9 1,612 179 38% 
Upper East 3 917 306 88% 
Upper West 2 574 287 84% 
North 3 1,855 618 69% 
Note: The Greater Accra Region is omitted because of its large urban population. 
Source: Bank of Ghana,2000 National Census, and  GSS (2000). 
 
In addition to the factors driving the high cost of credit in Ghana outlined in the previous 
section, there are additional problems that contribute to the scarcity of affordable credit for 
small-scale activities. One concern is the risk-aversion of the banking sector. The profile of 
depository banks in Ghana suggests that the banks are excessively risk averse, or do not 
feel under competitive pressures to expand their market share. They seem content to 
achieve the high rates of return from their current activities (see Bawumia, Belnye and 
Ofori, 2005). Small enterprises are likely to be perceived as more risky than large-scale, 
established firms and will therefore have a more difficult time securing credit. 
 
The system of rural banks is particularly prone to these perverse incentives. Although 
borrowers must provide, in most cases, collateral, business reports, and other 
documentation to access credit, the degree of strictness is minimal compared to the major 
commercial banks.4 This raises the risk profile of these loans still further and increases the 
incentive to hold other, less risky, assets – including excess reserves in the form of 
government securities. For example, in the first quarter of 2005, “primary reserves showed 
an excess of 9.0 percent over the mandatory minimum requirement of 13.0 percent. The 
secondary reserve ratio also recorded an excess of 26.2 percent above the mandatory 
requirement of 30.0 percent.” (Bank of Ghana, 2005b, p. 54). The Bank of Ghana notes 
that rural and community banks continue to shift investment into holding government 
bonds and bills, a trend that “can be explained by the apparent high risk associated with 
lending vis-à-vis the guaranteed return and risk-free nature of Treasury bills.” (Bank of 
Ghana, 2005b, pp. 53-4) 
 
                                                 
4    Personal communication between Ms. Lynda Pickbourn, national consultant on this project, and  Mr. 
Martin Ofori, Bank of Ghana. 
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There are significant problems on the demand side as well. Borrowers lack collateral and 
skills that would make them lower-risk, successful borrowers. This is true of small 
businesses as well as small borrowers in the city and the countryside. At the same time, the 
large deposit money banks appear to have relatively little interest in developing ways of 
acquiring information on the repayment prospects of small borrowers. 
 
Despite these problems, there is evidence that there has been growth in rural banking 
relative to the banking sector as a whole and that lending by these banks has begun to 
increase in recent years. Table 10 summarizes these changes from 2000 to 2004. These 
positive trends may represent an important step forward in increasing access to financial 
services in the rural areas. 
 
Table 10 
The Rural Banking Sector as a Share of the Total Banking Industry, Ghana 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Deposits 3.2% 4.3% 6.1% 6.3% 6.3% 
Loans 1.9% 2.3% 3.5% 3.3% 4.9% 
Total Assets 2.6% 3.5% 4.9% 4.9% 5.4% 
Source: Bank of Ghana. 
 
4.5. Informal financial institutions 
 
Informal entrepreneurs and small-scale businesses that cannot access formal credit markets 
often rely on informal sources of credit. Research suggests that, in some circumstances, 
informal credit institutions have distinct advantages vis-à-vis formal financial institutions. 
Informal credit institutions frequently have more detailed knowledge of local conditions, 
their clients, and the communities in which they operate (Lyon, 2003; Amoako-Tuffour, 
2002; Aryeetey and Udry, 1997). They often face lower transactions costs when extending 
credit to underserved communities and regions. In these respects, informal suppliers of 
credit have successfully relaxed some of the constraints that inhibit access to formal 
financial services for people working in small-scale enterprises or informal self-
employment.  
 
The historic development of Ghana’s banking sector partially explains the duality between 
formal and informal financial institutions. As noted previously, lending to government and 
public enterprises dominated the extension of credit in the country during the decades 
following independence. Many banks never had an incentive to develop the institutional 
capacity to collect information and monitor small-scale private lenders (Nissanke and 
Aryeetey 1998). Under these conditions, informal financial institutions helped to fill this 
gap. However, informal suppliers of credit face constraints of their own. 
 
Informal suppliers of credit are not well integrated into the banking system, limiting the 
resources at their disposal. Formal credit institutions enjoy economies of scale and can 
mobilize large amounts of deposits for credit extension. Informal credit networks lack the 
resources and scale economies of formal banks. However, large commercial banks 
currently cannot serve small-scale borrowers efficiently. By forging linkages between 
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formal and informal credit institutions, more financial resources could be made available to 
support the expansion and improvement of informal activities, with potentially large 
positive impacts on employment outcomes (Aryeetey, 2003, 1998; Amoako-Tuffour 
2002). These mutually beneficial interactions have not been exploited to their fullest extent 
in Ghana. We suggest ways in which these institutions could be better integrated later in 
the report.  
 
4.6 Credit and the Determinants of Investment in Ghana 
 
We have stressed that both monetary policy and institutional factors influence financial 
variables. These financial variables, in turn, affect real economic outcomes that partly 
determine employment opportunities in the country. One channel through which financial 
variables impact employment opportunities is through fixed investment in productive 
capacity. Research has suggested that financial development plays a role in determining 
the level of investment in sub-Saharan Africa (Ndikumana 2000). Therefore, it is useful to 
examine the determinants of fixed investment in Ghana, in the context of this discussion of 
the relationship between financial sector constraints and monetary policy. 
 
To investigate the determinants of investment in Ghana, we estimated an econometric 
model for the period 1961 to 2002. The details of the methodology and the statistical 
analysis are presented in Appendix B. Here we focus on the main findings of this exercise. 
The results of this analysis should be approached with some caution due to the relatively 
short time period and the limited amount of data available. Nevertheless, we found that a 
number of variables have a significant impact on investment in Ghana : current government 
spending, exports (influenced by the real exchange rate), domestic credit supplied to the 
public sector, and domestic credit supplied to the private sector (in the years after 1983 to 
reflect the beginning of economic reforms). Table 11 presents the long-run investment 
elasticities for these three variables. 
 
Table 11 
Responsiveness of Total Gross Investment (as a % of GDP) 
to key determinants of investment, Ghana, 1961-2002. 
Variable Elasticity 
Govt current expenditures (% of GDP) 0.78 
Total exports (% of GDP) 0.34 
Credit to the public sector (% of GDP) -0.57 
Credit to the private sector (% of GDP)* 0.27 
Note : Elasticities are evaluated at the variable means. Calculations based  
on the estimated coefficients of Equation (5a), Table A3, Appendix A. Total 
gross investment includes both public and private investment, since dis - 
aggregated data were not available for the time period investigated. 
* The elasticity of investment with respect to private sector credit is 
evaluated from 1984 onwards, when economic reforms were initiated. 
 
Current government expenditures were found to have a strong positive impact on 
investment, other factors being equal. Current expenditures could have a “crowding- in” 
effect on private investment for a number of reasons. At the macroeconomic level, higher 
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levels of current expenditures could raise aggregate demand and encourage greater private 
investment. At the sectoral level, spending on education and healthcare represent 
investments in Ghana’s human resources that could raise productivity, increase returns on 
investment, and encourage faster capital accumulation. Unfortunately, the lack of more 
disaggregated data over a significantly long period of time makes it difficult to untangle 
the impact of public expenditures on private investment in greater detail.  
 
Other studies of investment in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions have 
found that trade in general, and exports specifically, are important determinants of 
investment and growth (Ndikumana, 2000; Harrison, 1996). In the analysis of the 
determinants of investment, presented fully in Appendix B, the real exchange was found to 
have a significant impact on domestic investment: a depreciation in the real exchange rate 
was associated with higher rates of investment. The relationship between the real exchange 
rate and domestic investment could go either way. If a country was heavily dependent on 
imported capital goods, a depreciation could lower investment. However, if the positive 
impact on the tradable sector outweighs the negative impact on the cost of capital goods, 
the overall effect would be positive. In Ghana, this second situation appears to prevail. 
 
The financial variables produced more surprising results. The real, short-term interest rate 
had no discernable impact on investment in Ghana. Furthermore, the level of domestic 
credit supplied to the public sector had a significant negative impact on investment.  
 
The composition of domestic credit (previously illustrated in Figure 5), provides one 
explanation for this result. Throughout much of the period studied, the majority of 
domestic credit in Ghana financed the public sector – both government spending and 
public enterprises. Because of the country’s financial structure, more credit extended to the 
public sector reduces the incentive to lend to more risky, private sector activities. As 
discussed earlier, banks preferred to hold their assets in the form of government bonds, 
with their relatively high yields and low risk. They had little incentive to extend credit to 
the private sector, particularly to smaller enterprises. Other research into investment 
behavior in sub-Saharan Africa supports these conclusions: public borrowing has been 
associated with less fixed investment, if other factors remain the same (Ndikumana 2000).  
 
The impact of public credit and government spending on investment in Ghana is complex. 
These estimates suggest that government spending has had a positive impact on the rate of 
fixed capital investment in Ghana. However, increased domestic credit to the public sector 
– given the structure of the financial system and the ways in which monetary policy has 
been conducted – can discourage investment when other factors remain constant. In 
particular, increased credit to the public sector only has a negative impact on fixed 
investment when domestic credit to the private sector and government spending do not 
change. Therefore, the overall impact of government spending on investment activity 
depends on how public expenditures are financed, the structure of the financial system, and 
how monetary policy is conducted. Increased public borrowing may crowd out private 
investment when monetary policy tightens restrictions on domestic credit or if financial 
structures inhibit the extension of credit to finance private investment. 
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If we restrict our attention to credit to the private sector only, a different dynamic emerges. 
Over the entire time period, 1961-2002, our analysis shows little impact of private sector 
credit on domestic investment. However, the reforms that began in 1983 were associated 
with an increase in the share of credit going to the private sector. Overall, the credit 
markets showed increased buoyancy after the economic uncertainty of the 1970s and early 
1980s was tamed, although the cost of credit increased noticeably (Bownbridge, 1998).5 
After the reforms were introduced, our econometric estimates reveal evidence of a notable 
positive impact of private credit on domestic investment. 
 
These results suggest a number of important policy conclusions. First, monetary policy 
impacts real investment activity in Ghana through two channels: the real exchange rate and 
the amount of credit extended to the private sector. The macroeconomic model of the Bank 
of Ghana, discussed earlier, also found that private credit and the exchange rate were 
important channels through which monetary policy could affect real economic 
performance (Abradu-Otoo, et. al, 2003). Second, the effectiveness of expanding the credit 
supply depends on the institutions governing the domestic financial sector. Third, 
government spending can encourage domestic investment, but only if excessive domestic 
borrowing is avoided.  
 
Although the increase in private sector credit appears to have had an impact on domestic 
investment, financial liberalization, by itself, does not necessarily lead to economic and 
social development. The constraints outlined in this paper – high domestic real lending 
rates, the short-term structure of loans, large interest rate spreads, and limited access to 
financial services for agricultural and informal activities – could very well have been 
exacerbated by the process of liberalization. Structural problems still remain. Other 
researchers have found that the process of financial liberalization pursued under the 
structural adjustment programs did not adequately deal with the institutional problems of 
Ghana’s financial system (Aryeetey 2001, Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998). The reforms have 
not transformed the structure of the financial sector to support growth, employment, and 
poverty reduction. 
 
5. Possible solutions to structural problems in the financial sector 
 
As discussed earlier, institutional constraints in the financial sector will limit the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Therefore, a transition from an “inflation-targeting” 
monetary policy regime to a monetary policy regime that supports growth and employment 
must be coordinated with reforms to the financial sector. There are a number of concrete 
steps that could be taken to address the constraints identified in the previous section. Here 
we briefly discuss six such interventions: introduce credit guarantee schemes, develop a 
public deposit insurance policy, introduce asset-based reserve requirements, diversify the 
range of financial instruments available in Ghana, forge links between formal and informal 
financial institutions, and expand business services and financial information systems.  
 
5.1 Credit guarantee schemes to reduce risk premiums 
                                                 
5    The government also introduced policies to promote domestic investment in the mid-1980s (Brownbridge, 
1998). This could have helped strengthen the relationship between private credit and investment. 
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As mentioned above, substantial risk premiums can prove debilitating for investments in 
employment- improving activities. Extending credit to medium- and long-term productive 
investments is not attractive to banks in Ghana because of the perceived risk and the 
availability of substitute assets, such as treasury bills, that have high returns and are less 
risky. One way of reducing the risk associated with these investments is to have the 
government guarantee a portion of the loan to support approved projects. Government loan 
guarantees have implications for fiscal policy, since a non-performing loan would place 
demands on public resources. However, with adequate safeguards to prevent abuse, 
underwriting loans is a viable strategy to lower risk premiums for investments that support 
employment- intensive growth. 
 
One potential problem with loan guarantees is that they can create the wrong incentives for 
borrowers. If borrowers bear no responsibility for the consequences for non-performing 
loans, then the incentive to insure that employment-oriented investments bear fruit is 
weakened. Therefore, it is important to design a loan guarantee scheme that reduces risk 
premiums while simultaneously preserving a system of monitoring and accountability on 
the part of the borrower. This could include requiring the borrower to supply some form of 
collateral, even if a large portion of the loan were guaranteed. The collateral requirements 
could be far less stringent than would be the case for other types of loans.  
 
The interest rate charged on guaranteed loans would be lower than the prevailing market 
rate. The appropriate level for the concessional interest rate would be a weighted average 
of the market rate of interest for the type of loan extended and the risk-free rate of return 
on government securities. At this rate of interest, the program would not place any 
economic burden on the banks that participated in the guarantee scheme. However, it does 
suggest that the lowest possible interest rate would be the prevailing rate on government 
securities (for a 100% secured loan). Therefore, such a credit guarantee program can only 
lower the cost of borrowing so far. The program would be more effective if paired with 
strategies to reduce the average cost of borrowing, including the risk-free rate, throughout 
the Ghanaian economy.  
 
5.2 A public deposit insurance policy 
 
The structure of the liability side of banks’ balance sheets limits the effectiveness of 
financial intermediation in Ghana. Most of the deposits held by banks are short-term. This 
increases the risks that banks face in terms of meeting their obligations at any given 
moment. Short-term deposits raise the risks associated with lowering reserves and 
extending additional credit. In addition, a short-term liability structure makes it difficult to 
extend medium- and long-term credit. If resources are tied-up in longer maturity loans, a 
bank’s ability to meet short-term obligations is compromised. A public deposit insurance 
policy could reduce the risks associated with short-term deposits and encourage the 
extension of a larger supply of medium- and long-term credit. At the same time, steps 
would need to be taken to make sure that banks’ asset portfolio’s are not excessively risky 
in order to avoid “moral hazard” problems that beset some systems with deposit insurance.  
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5.3 Asset-based reserve requirements and prescribed assets  
 
The idea behind asset-based reserve requirements is straight- forward: give the banking 
system an incentive to hold a portfolio of assets that channels resources towards 
employment-targeted investments. In recent years, banks have preferred to hold short-term 
treasury bills with high yields rather than extending credit to riskier projects. The 
introduction of asset-based reserve requirements would alter these incentives. For example, 
if banks extend loans to approved employment-targeted projects, they would enjoy a lower 
reserve requirement than if they held other types of assets (e.g. other types of loans, t-bills, 
short-term securities, etc.). Banks that are subject to a lower reserve requirement would 
enjoy a competitive advantage in the credit market. By introducing such a system, financial 
resources could be directed to strategic projects, reducing the impediments to employment 
creation. 
 
Asset-based reserve requirements differ from other instruments sometimes used for the 
allocation of financial resources: prescribed assets. A prescribed asset policy represents a 
type of financial quota. Under such policies, a certain fraction of a bank’s (or other 
financial institution’s) assets must be held as investments or loans that support a priority 
area of economic development. Prescribed assets are not new to Ghana. In the past, banks 
were required to hold 20 percent of their assets as loans to the agricultural sector.  
 
Asset-based reserve requirements create incentives for lending in priority areas while 
prescribed asset policies typically stipulate that a fraction of assets much support 
investment in strategic sectors. A version of these strategies could be introduced in Ghana 
to support employment creation. As with other interventions into the financial markets, it is 
important to have safeguards in place to prevent corrupt uses of the mechanism.  
 
5.4 Diversify financial instruments 
 
The introduction of new, longer-term securities could improve the financial sector’s ability 
to manage assets and liabilities of different maturity structures. As a result, resources for 
medium- and long-term financing could be unleashed. One recent example was the 
creation of a new, longer maturity public debt instrument, the Government of Ghana 
Index-Linked Bonds. Previously, public debt was finance through the issue of short-term 
treasury bills, with high debt servicing costs. The creation of a longer-term debt instrument 
improves the ability of government to manage the public debt. In a similar fashion, the 
introduction of new financial instruments could help address other impediments in the 
financial system. For example, the introduction of a more vibrant long-term mortgage 
market could provide a means of mobilizing household savings, which currently get tied 
up in illiquid assets, for more productive uses. 
 
5.5 Forge linkages between informal and formal financial institutions 
 
Formal and informal credit markets interact in a number of different ways. In some cases, 
informal credit institutions may compete with or substitute for formal credit. In other cases, 
complementarities exist. For example, formal credit institutions may lend informally 
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mobilized deposits or informal lenders might act as intermediaries for formal institutions 
(Aryeetey 2003). Complementary linkages can be forged on a number of fronts. For 
instance, relationships could be built between formal banks and savings and credit 
associations in order to facilitate group savings and lending for informal and small 
enterprise development (Amoako-Tuffour 2002). Arrangements between formal banks and 
susu collectors – individuals who mobilize informal deposits and extend credit to their 
clients – to improve interest rates on deposits and enhance small-scale credit extension 
provide another example of how these linkages can be fostered (Aryeetey 1998).  
Developing these new institutional relationships will require a broader regulatory structure 
for suppliers of credit in Ghana that specifically incorporates a role for informal credit 
institutions.  
 
The lack of prudential regulations for informal financial institutions may hinder the ability 
to forge links between formal and informal institutions. Formal financial institutions may 
be reluctant to enter into a relationship with informal institutions, if there are no safeguards 
in place to ensure stability in the informal financial sector. An appropriate regulatory 
framework may need to be developed in order to integrate the activities of the two types of 
institutions.  
 
5.6 Business services and better information resources 
 
The lack of skills, technical support, and adequate information limit banks’ willingness to 
lend to small-scale producers. Therefore, there is a need to develop capacity for technical 
assistance, particularly in terms of managing the risks faced by small and medium 
enterprises. For example, legislation could be developed that requires all banks to have a 
highly functioning desk to deal with SME applications. Specific parameters would be set 
to evaluate whether banks comply with the regulations. Similarly, government could 
spearhead policies that support the establishment of credit bureaus which collect and 
maintain information on potential borrowers. These credit bureaus could be designed to 
specifically deal with the information problems associated with small-scale credit 
applications. The credit bureaus would be charged with facilitating financial services 
between lenders and potential borrowers. 
 
6. Summary and Recommendations  
 
We have identified three general financial and monetary obstacles hindering government 
attempts to generate more employment and growth: 
 
1. An inflation-reducing approach to monetary policy, similar to formal inflation-targeting, 
that does not sufficiently take into account the need for monetary policy to be more 
supportive of employment generation and economic growth. This is partly due to lack of 
timely information on the impact of monetary policy on real economic outcomes and also 
partly due to the way in which the goals of monetary policy are framed. 
 
2. High real lending rates and limited access to credit emanating from the structure of the 
country’s financial institutions. A monetary policy regime that exclusively focuses on 
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inflation and monetary aggregates often contributes to high real interest rates and 
exacerbates credit constraints. 
 
3. Insufficient utilization of financial resources that do exist to support borrowing that 
would generate more employment and productive economic activity more generally. 
 
A number of concrete recommendations to address these barriers can be formulated from 
the discussion and analysis in this report. 
 
First, the Bank of Ghana should adopt as its focus a dual mandate of stabilizing inflation at 
moderate levels while generating more employment and economic growth, a focus that is 
consistent with its current mandate. In time we would hope that this could lead to the 
establishment of employment generation and economic growth targets alongside inflation 
targets. 
 
Second, the Bank of Ghana, together with the Ghana Statistical Service, should accelerate 
its efforts to generate timely data on real economic activity, including employment, which 
can be used in its deliberations on monetary policy. 
 
Third, policies to reduce interest rate spreads, lower the cost of borrowing, and increase 
access to medium- to long-term credit should be developed and implemented. A number of 
strategies have been identified which would contribute to this objective: designing an 
appropriate credit guarantee scheme, improving the diversity of financial instruments 
available in terms of maturity structures, instituting a deposit guarantee program, 
investigating ways of reducing the interest rate on government securities, increasing 
competition within the commercial banking sector, and putting in place asset-based reserve 
requirements to channel credit toward employment-enhancing investments. 
 
Fourth, stronger linkages should be forged between the commercial banking sector and 
informal financial institutions. Informal financial institutions are frequently more efficient 
at providing access to informal and small-scale producers, but they lack the resources 
available to commercial banks. Government programs could encourage stronger ties 
between these sectors. A component of strengthening the linkages between formal and 
informal financial sectors would be to develop a more holistic regulatory framework to 
integrate the activities of the two types of institutions. 
 
Finally, monetary and financial sector policies much more deeply into the formulation of 
economic strategies for poverty reduction, rather than taking monetary policy as given. 
This is particularly important for the on-going evolution of the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (GPRS) – the country’s poverty reduction strategy paper that provides a roadmap 
to guide policymaking aimed at the ultimate objective of reducing poverty. Recasting 
monetary and financial sector policies as crucial instruments of development would make 
it much more likely that the policies would be formulated in such a way as to support the 
goals of employment generation and poverty reduction. This requires a fundamental re-
thinking of the role of monetary policy and financial sector reform in reducing poverty, 
raising living standards, and supporting equitable growth. Monetary and financial sector 
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policies should be reinvented as a positive force for poverty reduction, rather than a 
stabilization constraint that other policies must work around. 
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Appendix A. Monetary policy impacts on the growth, inflation and exchange rates in 
Ghana: VAR simulation experiments 
 
As we discussed in the text, the Bank of Ghana has undertaken a number of interesting 
econometric exercises to determine the channels and impacts of monetary policy. (see, for 
example, Bawumia, et. al., 2003 and Bawumia and Abradu-Otoo, 2003). These studies use 
vector error correction models (VEC’s) to analyze monetary policy. To utilize this 
framework, they used data going back as far as the 1970’s. They were mostly interested in 
understanding the interactions of key variables, rather than assessing the impacts of 
changes in monetary policy. 
 
For our work, we are interested in looking at the medium term impacts of changes in 
monetary policy on key variables such as inflation, economic growth and exchange rates. 
Moreover, we are concerned about significant structural change in the Ghanaian 
macroeconomic situation over the last thirty years or so, and have chosen to work with 
data only since the mid-1980’s. For these reasons, we use a somewhat simpler empirical 
framework more suitable to less data availability and more suitable to the kinds of policy 
experiments we want to run. In this appendix we describe our simple vector auto-
regression model and the monetary policy experiments that are summarized briefly in the 
body of this report. 
 
As reported in the text, and, for continuity, partly repeated here, we built two simple VAR 
models to study monetary policy changes. The first model analyzes the following 
variables: treasury bill rates, inflation, exchange rate changes and real economic growth. 
The second model substitutes the rate of growth of the money supply (M2 growth) for the 
treasury bill rate and retains the other endogenous variables. Variable definitions are 
presented in Table A1. 
 
Table A1 
Variables, Definitions and Sources 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Interest Rate 90-day interest rate; % Bank of Ghana 
Inflation 4-quarter rate of change of 
consumer price index; % 
Bank of Ghana 
Growth 4-quarter rate of growth of or real 
GDP; % 
Bank of Ghana 
Exchange Rate 4-quarter rate of change of the 
exchange rate; % 
Bank of Ghana 
Price of Oil Natural log of the $ price of oil Bank of Ghana 
Money Growth Rate of Growth of M2 Supply; % Bank of Ghana 
 
Initial Diagnostic Tests 
 
Unit root tests were performed on all the variables. According to the adjusted Dickey-
Fuller tests, none of these endogenous variables have unit roots according to conventional 
levels of significance.6 
                                                 
6 The treasury bill rate and money supply growth levels of significance are slightly larger than conventional. 
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Pair-wise Granger causality tests were also carried out on all the variables. Table A2 below 
reports the results: 
Table A2 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1986Q1 2004Q4, Lags: 4  
    
      Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    GROWTH does not Granger Cause EXCHNGRTCH 76  1.54774  0.19851 
EXCHNGRTCH does not Granger Cause GROWTH  1.47563  0.21942 
    
    INFLATION does not Granger Cause 
EXCHNGRTCH 76  1.78534  0.14206 
EXCHNGRTCH does not Granger Cause INFLATION  1.23954  0.30264 
    
    MGROWTH does not Granger Cause 
EXCHNGRTCH 76  4.42364  0.00311 
EXCHNGRTCH does not Granger Cause MGROWTH  1.32800  0.26862 
    
    CREDITGROWTH does not Granger Cause 
EXCHNGRTCH 76  1.90239  0.12022 
EXCHNGRTCH does not Granger Cause 
CREDITGROWTH  1.55824  0.19563 
    
    TBILL does not Granger Cause EXCHNGRTCH 76  0.98365  0.42252 
EXCHNGRTCH does not Granger Cause TBILL  1.44924  0.22756 
    
    INFLATION does not Granger Cause GROWTH 76  2.71144  0.03720 
GROWTH does not Granger Cause INFLATION  0.87916  0.48123 
    
    MGROWTH does not Granger Cause GROWTH 76  0.83841  0.50566 
GROWTH does not Granger Cause MGROWTH  3.12771  0.02026 
    
    CREDITGROWTH does not Granger Cause 
GROWTH 76  0.53188  0.71271 
GROWTH does not Granger Cause CREDITGROWTH  0.32809  0.85816 
    
    TBILL does not Granger Cause GROWTH 76  0.26183  0.90141 
GROWTH does not Granger Cause TBILL  3.08959  0.02142 
    
    MGROWTH does not Granger Cause INFLATION 76  1.36099  0.25684 
INFLATION does not Granger Cause MGROWTH  0.36590  0.83207 
    
    CREDITGROWTH does not Granger Cause 
INFLATION 76  1.13800  0.34625 
INFLATION does not Granger Cause CREDITGROWTH  2.62349  0.04229 
    
    TBILL does not Granger Cause INFLATION 76  1.15357  0.33923 
INFLATION does not Granger Cause TBILL  2.13656  0.08584 
    
    CREDITGROWTH does not Granger Cause 
MGROWTH 76  1.05996  0.38327 
MGROWTH does not Granger Cause CREDITGROWTH  1.60143  0.18417 
    
    TBILL does not Granger Cause MGROWTH 76  1.02689  0.39990 
MGROWTH does not Granger Cause TBILL  1.71368  0.15725 
    
    TBILL does not Granger Cause CREDITGROWTH 76  1.09504  0.36624 
CREDITGROWTH does not Granger Cause TBILL  0.79448  0.53293 
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The Granger-Causality tests suggest that only a few of these relationships are Granger 
“causal” at standard significance levels. The significant rela tions are given below in Table 
A3. 
 
Table A3 
Summary Results of Granger Causality Tests 
“Significant” Granger Relationships  1 Significance Levels  2 
Exchange Rate “causes” growth .22 
Growth “causes” exchange rates .20 
Money growth “causes” exchange rate 
changes 
.003 
Money growth causes credit growth .18 
Money growth causes tbill .15 
Economic growth “causes” tbills .037 
Economic growth “causes” money growth .02 
Inflation “causes” credit-growth  .04 
1 Significance refers to the statistical significance of rejecting the null hypotheses of NO granger causality.  
2 Normal significance levels are .01 to .10 but we use a broader range. 
 
The Granger tests find little support for the claim that monetary policy has a direct link to 
economic growth or inflation; the main link, based on the pair-wise tests, seems to be 
through its impacts on exchange rates. Money growth also might have an impact on 
treasury bill rates and credit growth. Otherwise, money and credit-growth appear to be at 
least partly endogenous with respect to inflation and economic growth. 
 
One must be cautious in interpreting these results, however. The main problem is that the 
data series are relatively short so these tests are subject to relatively few degrees of 
freedom. For this reason, we have chosen to interpret “significance levels” rather loosely. 
 
In order to better assess the underlying macroeconomic dynamics, we have built two 
simple VAR models and will use each of these to describe monetary policy experiments. 
 
Interest Rates as Tool of Monetary Policy 
 
The first VAR model examines four endogenous variables: treasury bill rate (t-bill), the 
rate of change of the exchange rate (exchange rate), the rate of real economic growth 
(growth) and inflation (inflation). The logarithm of the price of oil is included as an 
exogenous variable. 
 
The time period of the analysis is 1986 Q1 about 2004 Q4. Figure A1 shows the VAR 
impulse response functions with the following ordering: interest rate, exchange rates, 
inflation, growth. 
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Figure A1. 
Impulse Response Functions, 1986Q1 – 2004Q4,  
Interest Rates, Exchange Rates, Inflation, and Growth 
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These impulse response functions suggest that interest rate shocks work in more or less the 
expected ways. We will use this VAR as the basis for our policy simulations. 
 
Figure A2 below shows the simulation of the VAR model compared with the actual 
variables. As is often the case, the simulations only track the broad changes in the variables 
and do not do a good job of tracking extreme values and turning points. In any case, we 
use this model to simulate the impacts of changes in monetary policy. 
 
Figure A3 shows the impacts of lowering the interest rate by 2% points. The impacts on 
inflation, exchange rates and economic growth are all relatively modest. These results 
suggest that more expansionary monetary policy would not, according to these estimates, 
have large costs in terms of higher inflation and more variable exchange rates; but on the 
other hand, interest rate policy would have to be complemented by other policies to have  
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Figure A2 
 
 
significant impacts on economic growth. As we will see below, monetary policy that 
focuses on increasing the money supply could have larger impacts on the economy. 
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Figure A3. 
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Figure A3, cont. 
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VAR with Money Supply as tool of Monetary Policy 
 
The second VAR model substitutes money supply growth (using M2 as the definition of 
money), and includes exchange rate changes, inflation and real GDP growth as the other 
endogenous variables, and the logarithm of the price of oil as an exogenous variable. The 
impulse response functions (not shown) indicate that the money supply has fairly standard 
Epstein & Heintz. Monetary Policy/Financial sector in Ghana, April 2006.  
 44 
effects on output, exchange rates and inflation. We used this estimated VAR model to 
perform monetary policy experiments to show the impacts of more expansionary monetary 
policy. The figure shows the simulation of the model and compares the dynamic 
simulation results (the baseline) to the actual data. Once again, the model misses extreme 
values and misses turning points. We then used this model to simulate the impact of an 
increase in the rate of growth of the money supply by 5% points per year and keeping the 
higher growth rate for 5 years, over the period, 2000Q1 to 2004Q4 (Figure A4). 
 
Figure A4. 
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Figure A4. cont. 
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The next set of graphs (Figure A5) shows the difference between the baseline and a model 
with money supply growing by 5% higher growth rate.  
 
The impact on economic growth is to raise economic growth rate by an average of a 
quarter of a percentage point; inflation goes up by at most 2 percentage points. And the 
rate of exchange rate depreciation goes up by 2 or 3 percentage points.  Table A4 below 
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shows the year to year differentials between the baseline simulation and the more 
expansionary monetary policy. 
 
Figure A5. 
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Table A4 
Simulated Impacts of 5% Increase in Money Supply Growth, 2000-2004 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EXCHANGE RATE 1.51 0.70 1.83 1.82 2.17 
GROWTH 0.05 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.28 
INFLATION 0.27 2.07 2.30 1.77 1.50 
PRICE OF OIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MGROWTH 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
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Conclusion: 
 
Results from these VAR’s should be treated with caution. The time period used in the 
analysis, 1986Q1 – 2004 Q4, is somewhat short and therefore the VAR estimates are not as 
precise as one might like. Also, no model with four or five variables can capture the 
complexities of any economy, including that of Ghana. However, the results are 
suggestive. They indicate that expansionary interest and monetary policy can have 
modestly positive impacts on economic growth, without at the same time having strongly 
negative impacts on inflation and exchange rates. This implies that there is a justification 
for more expansionary policy. But, at the same time, to be sufficiently effective, 
expansionary monetary policy must be combined with policies in other areas, including the 
types of financial policies we discuss in the text. 
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Appendix B. Estimation of an aggregate investment function for Ghana. 
 
We estimated an aggregate investment function for Ghana using data from the IMF 
(International Financial Statistics), the World Bank (World Development Indicators), and 
the Government of Ghana. Typically, the determinants of investment are thought to 
include the cost of capital, an accelerator term, a measure of government expenditures or 
investment, and other exogenous variables (see Chirinko, 1993, for an overview). We used 
this kind of generic investment function as a starting place to investigate the determinants 
of investment in the Ghanaian economy: 
 
 ),,,( XgarfI =  
 
in which I represents gross investment, r represents the cost of capital, a the accelerator 
effect, g government spending, and X a matrix of other exogenous variables. 
 
Studies of investment in Ghana and sub-Saharan Africa suggest a number of additional 
explanatory variables: for example, the real exchange rate and the quantity of domestic 
credit (Ndikumana 2000, Brownbridge 1998). In addition, the importance of exported 
commodities to the Ghanaian economy could influence rates of investment. Table B1 
presents the variables that were used to estimate the investment function in this report 
along with their definitions. 
 
Table B1. 
Variable definitions. 
Variable  Definition 
INVEST Total gross fixed investment as a percentage of GDP 
GOVT Current government expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
INTEREST Discount rate adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator 
GROWTH Annual percent change in real GDP (captures accelerator effects) 
XCHNG Real exchange rate measured as the nominal cedi/$US adjusted for price levels in Ghana and the U.S. using the appropriate GDP deflators 
EXPORT Total exports as a percentage of GDP 
PUBCRDT Credit extended to the public sector as a percentage of GDP  
PVTCRDT Credit extended to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Non-stationarity is frequently an issue with macroeconomic time-series analysis. 
Therefore, it is essential to test all the above variables for the presence of unit roots. We 
used an augmented Dickey-Fuller procedure, with and without a deterministic linear trend, 
to test for stationarity. The results of these tests are summarized in Table B2. 
 
As can be seen from the table, all variables are non-stationary with the exception of the 
growth rate. Further analysis (not show) shows that the first differences of the non-
stationary variables are stationary – that is, all variables, except the growth rate, are 
integrated of order one. This raises the possibility that a cointegrating relationship exists 
between these variables, allowing for a more detailed specification of the investment 
function. 
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Table B2. 
Unit Root Tests Using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Methodology. 
 Intercept Intercept+Trend 
INVEST -1.30 (p=0.62) 
-1.85 
(p=0.66) 
GOVT -2.45 (p=0.14) 
-2.81 
(p=0.20) 
INTEREST -2.23 (p=0.20) 
-2.37 
(p=0.39) 
GROWTH -4.11 (p=0.003) 
-4.36 
(p=0.007) 
XCHNG -0.13 (p=0.94) 
-1.40 
(p=0.85) 
EXPORT -0.14 (p=0.94) 
-0.99 
(p=0.93) 
PUBCRDT -2.88 (p=0.06) 
-2.75 
(p=0.22) 
PVTCRDT -1.12 (p=0.70) 
-1.07 
(p=0.92) 
 
We can model the investment function empirically as a long-run cointegrating relationship 
coupled with an error-correction model that describes the adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium. The cointegrating relationship takes the general form: 
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in which Yt is the endogenous (dependent) variable, l denotes the length of the lag on the 
lagged endogenous variable, n is the number of exogenous variables Xj, and µt represents a 
stochastic error term. All the variables in the above equation are integrated of the same 
order – in this case, first order integration. 
 
 The corresponding error-correction can be expressed as: 
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in which the operator ? signifies the variables are first-differenced, m is the number of 
exogenous variables Zj not included in the cointegration specification, and et is another 
stochastic error term. Since the non-stationary variables are expressed as first-differences, 
all the variables in the error correction models are stationary, as long as a cointegrating 
relationship exists among the non-stationary variables such that the residual, µt, does not 
have a unit root. 
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Table B3 presents estimations of the investment function that attempt to estimate a long-
run equilibrium relationship among the non-stationary variables.  
 
Table B3. 
Long-Run Investment Function Estimates and Cointegrating Relationships, Ghana 1961-
2002. Dependent variable is Gross Investment as a Percentage of GDP (t-statistics for 
coefficient estimates are in parentheses). 
Equation (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) 
INVESTt-1 
0.535* 
(4.68) 
0.463* 
(5.08) 
0.411* 
(3.08) 
0.322** 
(2.24) 
0.286** 
(2.22) 
GOVTt 
0.235 
(1.05) 
0.465** 
(2.16) 
0.434** 
(2.04) 
0.747* 
(3.09) 
0.692* 
(2.89) 
XCHNGt 
0.047* 
(3.20) 
0.060* 
(4.33) 
   
INTERESTt 
0.0002 
(0.70) 
    
EXPORTt 
  0.364* 
(4.35) 
0.225** 
(2.27) 
0.169*** 
(1.91) 
PUBCRDTt 
 -0.200** 
(-2.23) 
-0.228** 
(-2.56) 
-0.290* 
(-3.28) 
-0.313* 
(-3.60) 
PVTCRDTt 
 -0.115 
(-0.57) 
-0.336 
(-1.54) 
-0.257 
(-1.23) 
 
 
PVTCRDTt x 
FINADJ1984- 
   0.467** 
(2.32) 
0.507** 
(2.53) 
Constant 0.002 (0.08) 
0.018 
(0.66) 
0.024 
(0.87) 
0.021 
(0.80) 
0.030 
(1.21) 
N 41 41 41 41 41 
R2 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 
D-W 1.87 1.91 2.00 2.09 1.98 
D-F 
(residual) 
-5.74 
(p<0.001) 
-5.93 
(p<0.001) 
-6.61 
(p<0.001) 
-6.63 
(p<0.001) 
-6.20 
(p<0.001) 
* denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 10% level. 
 
Equation (1a) estimates a fairly standard investment function in which the real interest rate 
is used to proxy the cost of capital. In addition, the estimates include the real exchange rate 
as an independent variable. The accelerator term – in this case, the GDP growth rate – is 
not included in the estimates of long-run equilibrium relationship. Instead, an accelerator 
terms will be incorporated into the error-corrections model that describes deviations 
around the long-run equilibrium. Moreover, the GDP growth rate variable is not integrated 
of the same order as the variables included in the long-run relationship.   
 
Of all the exogenous variables, only the coefficient on the real exchange rate is significant. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient on the real interest rate is particularly weak, running contrary 
to the expectations that are generated by the standard neoclassical investment function. 
However, the quantity of credit might be a more important determinant of domestic 
investment than the price of credit.  
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Equation (2a) re-estimates the model, this time substituting private and public sector credit 
variables for the real interest rate. The coefficients on government expenditure and the real 
exchange rate are positive and statistically significant. Domestic credit to the public sector 
has an independent, and significant, negative impact on domestic investment. However, 
credit to the private sector does not appear to have any significant impact on investment, 
when analyzed over the entire time period. 
 
A negative coefficient on the public sector credit variable does make sense in the Ghanaian 
context. During the period examined here, the majority of domestic credit financed public 
expenditures, not private investment. Banks held, and continue to hold, excess reserves of 
short-term government securities. This limits the role that the banking sector has played in 
financing real fixed investment. More credit to the public sector at a given level of 
government spending will tend to reduce gross investment, given the structure of the 
financial sector and the conduct of monetary policy over the period examined here. If 
government spending increases with public borrowing, then the effect on gross investment 
is ambiguous. 
 
The positive coefficient on the real exchange rate variable suggests that a real depreciation 
in the exchange rate encourages a higher level of investment in the long-run. This runs 
counter to arguments that a real depreciation will discourage investment in Ghana, because 
of the impact on the price of imported capital goods (Brownbridge 1998). One explanation 
for this seemingly incongruous finding is that investment in Ghana tends to be 
concentrated in the tradable sectors, particularly the key export sectors. Therefore, a real 
exchange rate depreciation leads to export growth and more investment. 
 
Equation (3a) replaces the real exchange rate variable with exports expressed as a percent 
of GDP. This coefficient on the exports variable is strongly positive, with the coefficient 
on the government spending variable remaining positive and the coefficient on credit to the 
public sector remaining negative. 
 
The economy underwent a series of fundamental reforms, beginning with the first 
structural adjustment program introduced in 1983. Both during and after these reforms, 
credit to the private sector grew as a share of GDP. Some of the constraints that limited the 
impact of private sector credit on domestic investment could have been relaxed during this 
period. To test this possibility, Equation (4a) adds an interaction term to the estimates of 
the investment function. Domestic credit to the private sector is multiplied by a dummy 
variable, representing financial sector reforms, that takes on a value of zero prior to 1984 
and a value of one for all other years.  
 
The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. This suggests that, after 
reforms were initiated, private sector credit become a more important determinant of 
investment in Ghana. This does not necessarily mean that all the elements of the financial 
sector reform process improved domestic investment. Some aspects of the reforms could 
have been detrimental. However, the impact of private credit on domestic investment is 
much stronger during the reform period than in previous years. 
 
Epstein & Heintz. Monetary Policy/Financial sector in Ghana, April 2006.  
 52 
Equation (5a) re-estimates the model represented by Equation (4a), but eliminates the 
private sector credit variable while retaining the interaction term. This equation was used 
to calculate the elasticity estimates presented in the main body of the paper (Table 11).  
 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the residuals from the five estimated equations in 
Table B3 all show that the residuals are stationary. This suggests that a cointegrating 
relationship exists among the non-stationary variables such that a linear combination of 
these variables is stationary. We selected the specification of Equation (5a) in Table B3 to 
represent the long-run equilibrium investment relationship. From this model, we proceeded 
to estimate the error-correction component of the overall model. 
 
Estimation of an error-correction model complements the estimates of the long-run 
investment relationships. An error-correction model captures the short-run adjustments 
around long-run investment trends by focusing on the impact of changes (not levels) in the 
independent variables and by examining how investment responds to deviations from its 
estimated long-run equilibrium level.  Table B4 presents estimates of the error-correction 
models based on the long-run investment function present in Equation (5a) of Table B3.  
 
 
Table B4. 
Error-Correction Models of the Investment 
Function, Ghana 1961-2002. 
Dependent Variable is the First Difference of 
Gross Investment as a Percentage 
of GDP (t-statistics for coefficient estimates 
are in parentheses). 
Equation (1b) (2b) 
GROWTH t 
0.111 
(1.13) 
0.151 
(1.60) 
?GOVTt 
0.726** 
(2.32) 
0.590** 
(1.97) 
?EXPORTt 
0.108 
(1.01) --- 
?PUBCRDTt 
-0.203 
(-1.55) --- 
?PVTCRDTt  
x FINADJ1987- 
-0.075 
(-0.16) --- 
RESIDt-1 
-0.769* 
(-3.91) 
-0.761* 
(-3.97) 
Constant -0.001 (-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.47) 
N 40 40 
R2 0.34 0.40 
D-W 1.77 1.87 
* denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 10% level. 
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The non-stationary variables are expressed as first differences in the estimates shown in 
Table B4. In addition, the growth rate, a stationary variable, is included in some of these 
estimates to capture any short-run impact of the accelerator. 
 
In Equation (1b), government spending is the only exogenous variable with a significant 
coefficient. The coefficient on the residual term is both significant and negative. This 
suggests that the error-corrections component is well-behaved – investment tends to return 
to the long-run equilibrium level after an exogenous shock. Equation (2b) estimates the 
same error-correction model, excluding the export and credit variables. In this model, the 
statistical significance of the coefficient on the growth rate improves (p-value=0.12) and 
the coefficient on the government spending term retains its sign and significance. Equation 
(2b) is also well-behaved in terms of the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. 
 
The results of this analysis – both the long-run cointegration and the short-run error 
correction models – should be approached with some caution. Given the lack of quarterly 
data for many of the variables, only a limited number of observations were available, 
despite efforts to maximize the length of the period studied. The limited availability of data 
for the entire period restricted the choice of variables. In some cases, the most appropriate 
variables for estimating an investment function were not readily available. As with many 
empirical macroeconomic models, the possible endogeneity of the variables could affect 
the reliability of the estimates. Unfortunately, the limited number of variables and the 
relatively small number of observations prevent the application of more sophisticated 
dynamic models. Despite all these caveats, the exercise presented here does provide a 
number of useful insights into aggregate investment behavior in Ghana. 
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Appendix C. Meetings and consultations  
 
Meetings and consultations primary took place in Accra, Ghana in March 2005. In 
addition, Lynda Pickbourn, the national consultant working on the study, engaged in 
selected follow-up consultations during June and July 2005. 
 
Dr. J.S. Abbey (Centre for Policy Analysis) 
Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia (Bank of Ghana) 
Ms. Grace Bediako (Ghana Statistical Service) 
Mr. Daniel Boakye (World Bank, Accra) 
Mrs. Angela Brown-Farhat (National Development Planning Commission) 
Prof. George Gyan-Baffour (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning) 
Hon. Alan Kyeremateng (Ministry of Trade and Industry) 
Mr. Daniel Ato Kwamina Mensah (Ghana Association of Bankers) 
Mr. Winifred Nelson (National Development Planning Commission) 
Mr. Jerry Odotei (National Development Planning Commission) 
Mr. Martin Ofori (Bank of Ghana) 
Dr. Nii K. Sowa (Centre for Policy Analysis) 
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